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Abstract
The main purpose of this note is to model an imperfect competitive and vertically inte-
grated market structure of production and trafficking of cocaine. We consider the particular
case of colombian cocaine market, but the results could be generalized to different scenarios.
We model three main participants: farmers, producing the coca-leaf and being price-takers in
its market; insurgent groups, producing paste of cocaine and being a local monopsony in the
coca-leaf market; and cocaine traffickers, being an oligopoly competing a la Cournot. We find
out an explicit relationship between the price of coca-leaf and paste of cocaine, with the coca-
leaf elasticity of supply. An inelastic coca-leaf supply allows the insurgent groups to increase
the gap between the price of coca-leaf and the price of the paste of cocaine. Additionally, the
insurgent groups obtain important profits from the oligopolistic market structure of cocaine
market, because the increase in the price of cocaine also increases the price of paste of cocaine,
through the increase in its demand. These profits feed every step in the pyramid of cocaine
production exacerbating the problem and making more difficult its solution. These remarks
offers important information to explain the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of some national
and international policies in the war against illegal drugs.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that Colombia is a very important participant in the market of
cocaine. The critical consequences from this market in the social and political
development of the country has been subject of intense debate, into the academic
work and outside. Different national and international policies have tried to solve the
problem. In particular, the Plan Colombia was designed with two main purposes,
on one hand, reducing the production and trafficking of cocaine and, on the other
hand, reducing the violent power of insurgent groups.
According to DNP (2006), the National Department of Planning of Colombia, its
results are ambiguous, especially in the war against cocaine. Becker, Murphy and
Grossman (2006) suggest an answer for this sort of puzzle by considering the price
in-elasticity of demand. Decreases in the supply of cocaine increase its price and,
given an in-elastic demand function, it increases the profits, so we end up with a
very profitable business. This paradox motivates the research on the policies against
the supply of illegal drugs, its functionality and results.
For the particular case of Colombia, the existing literature models the cocaine
market as a perfect competitive and vertically integrated one. According to Mej´ıa
and Posada (2008) there are producers of coca-leaf, base or paste of cocaine, and
finally cocaine. The farmers and insurgent groups participate in the production of
coca-leaf and paste of cocaine, and the drug traffickers operate in the final market.
The coca-leaf is a necessary input for producing base or paste of cocaine and, in
turn, this is a necessary input for producing cocaine.
Toward a policy analysis, Grossman and Mej´ıa (2008) models the war against
drugs by considering some supply policies such as eradication and interdiction. With
eradication the government control the crop of coca-leaf; and, with interdiction, it
decreases the amount of traded illegal drug. Within a competitive partial equilib-
rium model, they discuss the work of insurgent groups in the conflict on productive
factors, in particular, arable land for producing coca-leaf.
Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2013) extends the later result by considering a competitive
vertical integration of the market. There is also conflict on the control of arable land
for producing coca-leaf. They found that interdiction is a more efficient policy than
eradication. In the present note, we also model the market as vertically integrated,
but we explicitly incorporate some imperfect competition factors in the market.
However, we do not model the conflictive problem on the arable land. We assume
the presence of insurgent groups in a region and study their market power.
The general idea of our model is as follows. There are some farmers producing
the crop of coca-leaf in the mountains. They are price-takers facing a trade-off
between producing coca-leaf, with important profits but risky, and producing other
commodities, with low profits without risk. There are some insurgent groups with
control on the national territory. They are a local monopsony in its territory by
fixing the price of coca-leaf to induce the farmers to produce the crop1. Its function
in the market is of producing paste of cocaine in laboratories with standardized
techniques. They obtain important profits in trading it to cocaine traffickers.
Cocaine traffickers are the final group of the pyramid. The cocaine traffickers buy
the paste of cocaine to insurgent groups, and produce the cocaine for consumption.
1This market structure is remarked in the UNODC and Gobierno de Colombia (2013) report, and it is analyzed
in Mej´ıa and Rico (2010) with empirical data about the production of illegal drugs in Colombia.
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They are an oligopoly competing a la Cournot with homogeneous marginal costs.
The important profits from trading cocaine hold important profits from producing
paste of cocaine which, in turn, hold important profits from producing coca-leaf,
and it works by feeding the circle.
Considering imperfect competitive factors in the colombian cocaine market offers
important elements in the discussion. First, the price of coca-leaf and paste of
cocaine is related with the coca-leaf elasticity of supply. The in-elasticity of this
supply enables insurgent groups to acquire important profits by putting relatively
low prices to coca-leaf, and obtaining relatively high prices to the paste of cocaine.
This elasticity is related with the scale returns of the coca-leaf production function
and the eradication or interdiction programs from the national government.
Second, the price of the cocaine is not only determined by marginal costs and
risks, but also the number of the traffickers. In an oligopoly we have some traffickers
producing and trading a higher quantity than a monopolistic market, but a lower
quantity than a perfect competitive market. This limitation in the production en-
ables the traffickers to obtain important profits from the in-elasticity of the demand
of cocaine, and it determines the prices from the market demand function.
This note is organized as follows. After this introduction, we study the produc-
tion of coca-leaf. Then, we model the participation of insurgent groups as a local
monopsony by fixing the price of the coca-leaf. Then, we study the market of cocaine
as an oligopoly competing a la Cournot. Finally, we present a brief discussion on the
elasticity of substitution in the coca-leaf production function, and the references.
2 Production of coca-leaf
Let us start with the farmers. They are the base of the pyramid of the cocaine
production. They produce coca-leaf (cl) by using land (l) and other factors (fcl),
which may be capital or labour. Let a, b ∈ R++ be the technological factors of l
and fcl respectively, 0 6= ρ < 1 the elasticity of substitution between l and fcl, and
0 < β < 1 the returns to scale of the production function.
Let us write the production function of cl as a CES-production function:
cl = [alρ + bfρcl]
β
ρ (1)
The governmental policies may have important effects on this production function.
In particular, eradication and interdiction may decrease a and b by inducing the
cl-producers to produce the crop using both non-conventional labour techniques
and non-productive portions of land. In general, the production may be inefficient.
These policies may also have a long-run negative effect on β.
The government aims to eliminate the production of cl by going to the jungle. In
one case, it could find and destroy the crop with probability σpcl, and puts a penalty
of χcl to the producers. In the other case, it could interdict a proportion τcl of traded
cl with probability σccl. Let pcl be the price of cl, and r, w the prices of l and fcl
respectively. Let us define the expected profits from cl:
Definition 1 A cl-producer maximizes the following expected profit function:
E [picl] =
(
pcl [al
ρ + bfρcl]
β
ρ (1− τclσccl)− rl − wfcl
)
(1− σpcl)− χclσpcl
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Notice that (1 − τclσccl) is the portion of cl that could effectively survive the inter-
diction of the government. Also, if σpcl = 1 then the farmer loses its profits, and gets
a penalty of χcl. The farmer decides to produce cl if E [picl] > 0, so cl increases with
the increases of pcl and the decreases of σ
p
cl, σ
c
cl, χcl and the costs.
Proposition 1 The supply function of cl(pcl) is given by:
cl(pcl) =
 βpcl(1− τclσccl)ab[
a(br)
ρ
ρ−1 + b(aw)
ρ
ρ−1
] ρ−1
ρ

β
1−β
Proof : Maximize the expected profit function of Definition 1. 
The decrement in the factor productivity, decrease the optimal supply of cl but,
again, the effect is neutralized by pcl. If pcl is highly enough to give E [picl] > 0 then
the farmer becomes a cl-producer even with an inefficient system of production.
The pcl ends up being a fundamental variable in the production of cl and it depends
crucially on the price-elasticity of the supply as we show in the next section.
The price elasticity of the supply of cl is given by β/(1−β). The more decreasing
returns to scale in the production function, the more in-elastic supply of cl. In the
short-run, the elasticity depends on the technology of producing cl; in the long-run,
it may also depend on the result of governmental policies such as crop substitution,
eradication and interdiction.
Proposition 2 The optimal expected profit function of a cl-producer is given by:
E [picl] =
 pcl(1− τclσccl)(βab)β[
a(br)
ρ
ρ−1 + b(aw)
ρ
ρ−1
]β(ρ−1)
ρ

1
1−β
(1− β)(1− σpcl)− χclσpcl
Proof : Use Proposition 1 in the expected profit function of Definition 1. 
As we will see in the next section, the insurgent groups are able to control pcl.
They use it as an instrument for inducing the farmers to produce the coca-leaf crop.
The farmers face a trade-off between, from one hand, a risky activity penalized by
the government, and on the other hand, a very profitable activity assisted by the
insurgent groups. The market power and the efficiency of the governmental policies
define the dynamic of this structure.
3 Production of paste of cocaine
Let us continue with the insurgent groups. They are the second stage of the pyramid,
with the main purpose of connecting the cl-producers with the cocaine traffickers.
They produce past of cocaine (pc) by using coca-leaf (cl) and other factors (fpc),
which may also be capital or labour. Let d ∈ R++ be the Hicks-neutral technological
factor of producing pc, and α ∈ (0, 1) the elasticity of pc to cl.
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Let us write the production function of pc as a Cobb-Douglas-production function:
pc = dfpccl
α (2)
The government is also in conflict with the insurgent groups. In particular, it looks
for the producers of paste of cocaine, which is a necessary input for producing
cocaine. Let us suppose it could interdict a proportion τpc of pc with probability
σcpc. The pc is usually produced in the jungle, near to the cl-crop so σ
c
pc ≈ σccl.
Definition 2 The profits of producing pc are given by:
pipc = ppcdfpccl
α(1− τpcσcpc)− wfpc − pcl(cl)cl
Where ppc is the price of paste of cocaine, and pcl(cl), w are the prices of coca-leaf
and other factors, respectively. The pcl depends on cl because the insurgent groups
have local monopsonistic power. They are the unique pc-producer in the region, so
they are the only one cl-buyer. They use this market power in fixing pcl.
Theorem 1 The insurgent groups fix pcl according to the following rule:
pcl =

(
αppcdfpc(1− τpcσcpc)
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)1−β
[
a(br)
ρ
ρ−1 + b(aw)
ρ
ρ−1
] ρ−1
ρ
β(1− τclσccl)ab

β(1−α)
1
1−αβ
Proof : Taking dpipc
dcl
= 0 we have:
αppcdfpccl
α−1(1− τpcσcpc) = pcl(cl) + cl
dpcl(cl)
dcl
Let εcl,pcl =
dcl
dpcl
pcl
cl
be the price elasticity of the supply of cl. Then we have,
αppcdfpccl
α−1(1− τpcσcpc) = pcl
(
1 +
1
εcl,pcl
)
Replace Proposition 2 and, after some calculations, we have the required result. 
There are some insights behind this equation. First, increments in the marginal
income of pc-producers induce increments in the marginal income of cl-producers.
The profits in the business benefit every step of the pyramid. Second, the pcl must
cover both the marginal costs of production and the associated risk.
Third, an elastic supply of cl induces insurgent groups to increase pcl for sustain-
ing the production of cl. Fourth, increments in the technology of pc increases its
production, and its demand of cl, so pcl also increase. Finally, the effect of σ
c
pc on
pcl is ambivalent because it also affect ppc so we will analyse it in the next section.
We could calculate the supply of cl with the previous information.
Proposition 3 The supply of cl is given by
cl =
 αβabdppcfpc(1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)[
a(br)
ρ
ρ−1 + b(aw)
ρ
ρ−1
] ρ−1
ρ
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)

β
1−αβ
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Proof : Replace Theorem 1 in Proposition 1. 
There is a positive relationship between cl and ppc. A possible reason from the
model is because the increment in ppc increase the production of pc, and in turn it
increases the demand of cl, increasing pcl. It is a possible way to transfer profits
from an step of the pyramid to another. Now, we are able to estimate the supply
function of pc:
Proposition 4 The supply function of pc is given by:
pc =
αβabppc(dfpc) 1αβ (1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)[
a(br)
ρ
ρ−1 + b(aw)
ρ
ρ−1
] ρ−1
ρ
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)

αβ
1−αβ
Proof : Replace Proposition 3 in the equation 2. 
The insurgent groups have local monopsonistic power in the cl market. However,
there are some insurgent groups in the country, so we assume they do not have any
market power in the pc market. In this case, the ppc is determined through the inter-
action between insurgent groups and cocaine traffickers. We study this interaction
in the following section.
4 Cocaine traffickers
Let us finish the vertical structure of the market with the cocaine traffickers. They
are on the top of the pyramid of cocaine business, obtaining important profits and
also assuming important risks. They produce cocaine, and trade it in a country
different where it was produced. The reason of that is the important difference in
the willingness-to-pay for cocaine of the consumers in both countries.
There are n cocaine traffickers, and let i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n} be their counter. Let
c = Σni=1ci be the total quantity of cocaine, where ci is the portion of the market
corresponding to trafficker i ∈ I. The production function is ci = (1/n)pc where
(1/n) is the amount of pc used by trafficker i in producing ci.
As buyers, cocaine traffickers have no important power in the market of paste of
cocaine. However, as sellers, they operate in an oligopolistic market competing each
other a la Cournot. They try to increase the quantity of c for obtaining an important
participation in the market, nevertheless, it is constrained to the marginal cost of
production. Suppose the marginal cost is homogeneous among them.
Let us assume that each cocaine trafficker has a marginal cost of µ. The gov-
ernment wants to eliminate the production of c by seeking cocaine traffickers. It
could eliminate the production of ci with probability σ
p
c , and puts a penalty of χc to
the trafficker. It could also interdict a proportion τc of ci with probability σ
c
c. The
expected profits are given by:
Definition 3 The profits from producing ci are given by:
E [pici ] = (pcci(1− τσcc)− µci) (1− σpc )− χcσpc
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Where pc is the price of cocaine in the consumer country. It is clear ppc is part
of µ but, given the huge difference pc − ppc, we consider ppc is not relevant in the
maximization process of the cocaine trafficker. We prefer to consider ppc as a non-
significantly part of µ, and add it to the transportation cost, and the efforts of
passing the interdiction, or trading the cocaine in the market.
As it is usual, the term (1− τcσcc) is the portion of ci passing the interdiction of
the government in the producer country. Also, If σpc = 1 then the drug trafficker
loses its profits and gets a penalty of χc. The government of the consumer country
puts a penalty of κ for being caught consuming c with probability of σdc . Let η be
a parameter of persistence in the consumption of c.
Definition 4 The cocaine market demand function is given by:
pc = ηc
−θ − κσdc
Where θ ∈ R++ is a parameter affecting the elasticity of the demand of c. With this
demand function we use the following expected profit function:
Definition 5 The profits of the cocaine trafficker i ∈ I are given by:
E [pici ] =
(
(ηc−θ − κσdc )ci(1− τcσcc)− µci
)
(1− σpc )− χcσpc
The cocaine trafficker maximizes its profit function in terms of ci. The solution of
this problem gives us the optimal individual quantity produced for each trafficker,
the total quantity traded in the market and its price. With this information we are
able to solve the problem for the market of pc.
Theorem 2 The total quantity of cocaine traded in the market is given by:
c =
(
η(1− τcσcc)
[µ+ κσdc (1− τcσcc)]
n− θ
n
) 1
θ
The price of the cocaine traded in the market is given by:
pc =
nµ+ θ(1− τcσcc)κσdc
(n− θ)(1− τcσcc)
Proof : We proceed in two steps. First, we prove that each cocaine trafficker has
the same participation in the market. Let i 6= j ∈ I be two cocaine traffickers with
the following optimal conditions:[
η(c−θ − θcic−θ−1)− κσdc
]
(1− τcσcc) = µ[
η(c−θ − θcjc−θ−1)− κσdc
]
(1− τcσcc) = µ
From these conditions, we have
c−θ − θcic−θ−1 = µ+ κσ
d
c (1− τcσcc)
η(1− τcσcc)
c−θ − θcjc−θ−1 = µ+ κσ
d
c (1− τcσcc)
η(1− τcσcc)
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Then, we have each cocaine trafficker has the same participation in the market be-
cause ci = cj. Write c1 = c2 = ... = cn. We are able to write c as nci in the i’s
optimality condition. After some calculations we have:
ci =
1
n
(
η(1− τcσcc)
[µ+ κσdc (1− τcσcc)]
n− θ
n
) 1
θ
From this, we derive directly the claimed result. 
The risk associated to the traffic and consumption of c increase its price. Because
the risk is so important, the marginal income must be so important. If the demand
is inelastic, the more price the more total income of cocaine traffickers, so it increases
the disposition to produce c. However, the more number of cocaine traffickers, the
less price of cocaine because it also increases the total amount of cocaine.
Let us estimate the demand of paste of cocaine:
Proposition 5 The demand of pc is given by:
pc =
(
η(1− τcσcc)
[µ+ κσdc (1− τcσcc)]
n− θ
n
) 1
θ
Proof : Because c = pc. 
One idea behind this equation is that the more persistence η in the consumption of c,
the more production of c, and pc and cl. We then have a rainfall effect, through the
prices and quantities, from the top to the base of the pyramid. The more profitable
cocaine market, the more profitable paste of cocaine and coca-leaf markets.
Finally, we are able to estimate the ppc previously considered.
Proposition 6 The ppc is given by:
ppc =
[
a(br)
ρ
ρ−1 + b(aw)
ρ
ρ−1
] ρ−1
ρ
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)
αβab(dfpc)
1
αβ (1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
(
η(1− τcσcc)
[µ+ κσdc (1− τcσcc)]
n− θ
n
) 1−αβ
αθβ
Proof : Equal Propositions 4 and 5. 
This equation relates insurgent groups, simultaneously, with cl-producers and co-
caine traffickers. First, the more in-elastic supply of cl, the higher ppc. With an
in-elastic supply curve of cl the insurgent groups are able not only to decrease pcl
but increase ppc. It increases the gap ppc − pcl ending up with a very profitable
business for them.
Second, the increment of c-production increases ppc through its demand. There
is a perfect positive relation in the production of c and pc so they move in the same
way. Third, the risk may also modify ppc. The riskier cl production, the higher pcl
and the higher ppc to compensate the difference. Also, the riskier c production, the
higher pc and, given an in-elastic demand of c, that increases c, so it also increases
pc and ppc.
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5 Appendix
In this appendix we are going to estimate pcl, cl, pc and ppc when ρ changes. In par-
ticular, we consider two scenarios. First, we could have ρ = 0, with no substitution
between l and fcl. The eradication policy may have important effects in reducing cl
by reducing the proportions of l and fcl. In this case, the factors are perfect com-
plements and we are able to write the production function as cl = minβ{al, bfcl}.
Second, we could have ρ→ −∞, with perfect substitution between l and fcl. The
policies of eradication or land substitution may have no important effects, because
the producer is able to alter the usage of one factor to another. In this case, the
factors are perfect substitutes and the production function may be written as a
linear function cl = (al + bfcl)
β.
Corollary 1 The insurgent groups fix pcl according to the following rule:
a) If ρ→ 0:
pcl =
(αppcdfpc(1− τpcσcpc)
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)1−β (
br + aw
β(1− τclσccl)ab
)β(1−α) 11−αβ
b) If ρ→ −∞:
pcl =
(αppcdfpc(1− τpcσcpc)
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)1−β (
min{ r
a
; w
b
}
β(1− τclσccl)
)β(1−α) 11−αβ
Corollary 2 The supply of cl is given by:
a) If ρ→ 0:
cl =
αβabdppcfpc(1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
(br + aw)
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)

β
1−αβ
b) If ρ→ −∞:
cl =
αβdppcfpc(1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
min{ r
a
; w
b
}
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)

β
1−αβ
Corollary 3 The supply of pc is given by:
a) If ρ→ 0:
pc =
αβabppc(dfpc) 1αβ (1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
(br + aw)
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)

αβ
1−αβ
b) If ρ→ −∞:
pc =
αβppc(dfpc) 1αβ (1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
min{ r
a
; w
b
}
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)

αβ
1−αβ
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Corollary 4 The ppc is given by:
a) If ρ→ 0:
ppc =
(br + aw)
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)
αβab(dfpc)
1
αβ (1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
(
η(1− τcσcc)
[µ+ κσdc (1− τcσcc)]
n− θ
n
) 1−αβ
αθβ
b) If ρ→ −∞:
ppc =
min{ r
a
; w
b
}
(
1 + 1
εcl,pcl
)
αβ(dfpc)
1
αβ (1− τpcσcpc)(1− τclσccl)
(
η(1− τcσcc)
[µ+ κσdc (1− τcσcc)]
n− θ
n
) 1−αβ
αθβ
In each case, there are differences in the impact of the technological factors and
factorial costs on each estimated variable. With perfect complements, both techno-
logical factors and factorial costs have a significant impact on the estimated vari-
ables, however, with perfect substitutes, there is only one technological factor or
only one factorial cost with a significant impact. With them, we have the same sort
of previously considered relations but with different proportions.
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